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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 In India, municipal development projects benefiting the public often get impeded by the political 
and institutional framework of the Central Government. In many cases in India, a major constraint is 
financing these projects. According to the 12th Finance Commission report most of the infrastructure 
initiatives have been stalled due to financial constraints. For instance, the shortfall in financing to 
achieve the water and sanitation sector goals in India’s Tenth Plan is estimated at INR 179 billion.  
Without the discretion to issue municipal bonds, municipalities are often dependent on transfers from the 
Government of India (GOI) since direct investment for these projects is difficult to secure. 
While municipal governments are responsible for public service provision, their ability to do so is 
often constrained by inadequate GOI appropriations and/or missing municipal bond markets.  On the other 
hand, private investors often lack the incentives to invest in public service projects due to high risks and 
insufficient returns.  As a result, the provision of public goods such as infrastructure projects can be 
delayed or cancelled.  Tax-free municipal bonds provide a potential mechanism to bridge the financing gap. 
We have described the actual process of municipal bond process using the example of Corporation 
of Chennai and the desalination water project they propose to build. We present how tax incentives, 
transfers and private savings tie into the municipal bond framework. We believe that only a well 
performing municipality can be allowed to be fiscally independent and thus chose the Corporation of 
Chennai for analysis and go on to show what checks and balances are needed in the Indian scenario to 
support such a move towards sustainable financial decentralization. 
This policy paper analyzes four key dimensions of the expansion of the municipal bond market. 
Firstly, we analyze the driving forces for the evolution of a municipal bond market. Secondly, we develop 
an economic framework to value a municipal debt instrument and to estimate the optimal debt for the 
municipality to issue. In this section we also discuss the dynamics of the model and impacts of shocks and 
economic transfers on the municipal debt. Thirdly, we map the stakeholders and analyze the threats and 
benefits of a municipal bond issuance for these stakeholders. Finally, we recommend a framework for 
expansion of the municipal bond market while minimizing the potential for fiscal irresponsibility and 
uncontrolled growth of sub-national debt.  
We propose the creation of Special Municipal Zones based on strong credit rating, accrual based 
accounting systems, optimal debt to revenue collection ratios and a strong financial need of the 
municipalities. To support such Special Municipal Zones, we recommend several key changes in the 
institutional framework including creation of the Municipal Securities Board of India. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The right financing mechanism for development projects has been debated over years and the right 
financing method depends on various factors, inter alia institutional capacity, access to credit, maturity of 
capital markets, project returns, and investor’s risk appetite. In this paper we analyze the use of municipal 
bonds as a financing tool for development projects. Although other financing mechanisms such as pooled 
financing, private investment, and loans are viable options, we focus on the municipal bond instrument as 
many municipalities in India have started to experiment with municipal bonds since 1997.  While greater 
discretion for municipalities to issue bonds has the potential to increase accountability of municipal 
decision makers to local constituents, legitimate moral hazard concerns leading to fiscal irresponsibility and 
unsustainable growth of sub-national debt complicates this issue.  
Municipal bond as a concept means the municipality in a country issues bonds to raise capital to 
finance its projects. We are advocating the use of municipal bonds in certain regions of developing 
countries which have sufficiently strong institutional and economic systems. The two key reasons for using 
municipal bonds are greater fiscal decentralization and effective distribution of funds by the GOI in the 
country.  
To illustrate this case, we have looked at India and specifically the case of Corporation of Chennai 
(COC)i. We chose this municipality due to their strong economic performance along with their growing 
need for alternate financing routes. COC is an urban local body located in Chennai, the capital of the state 
of Tamil Nadu in India. We believe that COC should be granted limited discretion in raising capital 
through municipal bonds so that the state government can redirect its finances to other cities and towns and 
make effective use of funds. We show how COC on its own merit can raise capital through the issuance of 
bonds and then propose an economic model to estimate the “optimum” debt level that the city can bear 
such that the investors would be able to obtain tax free returns in such an environment.  
We look at cases of municipal bonds to identify potential pitfalls and draw important lessons.  
Based on our analysis and these studies, we propose policy recommendations such that increased but 
limited fiscal independence be granted to municipalities such as COC and other well performing 
municipalities in India. India is coming of age where the country has demonstrated discipline and sustained 
economic growth in the last decade. It is important that the Government of India (GOI) address the need for 
greater fiscal flexibility at the municipal level while implementing safeguards against unsustainable sub-
national debt accumulation in a way that rewards the well performing municipalities. Finally we conclude 
that this move towards the issuance of municipal bonds by local bodies should be a screened approach so 
that the exuberance does not lead to uncontrolled growth of sub-national debt as a result of moral hazard.  
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND 
 
While the 74th Constitutional Amendment of 1992 devolved a variety of service provision 
responsibilitiesii to Municipalities, the sources of revenue devolved to municipalities have typically been 
insufficient, leaving the municipalities dependent on higher levels of government.iii  Despite the change 
envisioned by the 74th Amendment, a study for the Twelfth Finance Commission found that “the tax 
jurisdiction of municipalities has not undergone any noticeable shift even with their changing functional 
portfolio.”iv  As Table 1 shows, fiscal transfers from states to municipalities still comprise a significant 
portion of municipal revenues, averaging 31.7% in 2001-2002, and have grown at an average rate of 13.5% 
over the same period.v   
However, according to the 12th Finance Commission report, numerous infrastructure initiatives 
have been stalled due to financial constraints.vi  In addition, the World Bank has identified a large financing 
gap for water infrastructure projects and their maintenance.vii  The water sector has seen a decreasing trend 
in budgetary allocations, most of which is now used for personnel costs, combined with a growing need for 
future investments.viii  The shortfall in financing to achieve the water and sanitation sector goals in India’s 
Tenth Plan is estimated at INR 179 billion ix .  Since traditional financial resources (state budgetary 
allocations, Housing and Urban Development Corporation, and municipal resources) have fallen short of 
estimated investment needs, Indian municipalities have turned to alternatives, including municipal bonds.x   
In the state of Tamil Nadu, Section 66 of the Tamil Nadu Municipalities Act of 1998 authorized 
municipalities to take out loans from the public to finance deficits and infrastructure investments, 
contingent on the prior approval of the state government.  The state government has guaranteed the loan  
liabilities of municipalities but is not obligated to do so.  Also, Section 66 authorizes ULBs to issue 
bonds for specific capital expenditures provided that an independent credit rating is provided.xi   
!
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Table 1: Role of Transfers in Municipal Finances 
 
State 
Transfers 
(INR 
millions), 
2001/02 
% of total 
municipal 
revenues, 
2001/02 
Avg Annual 
Growth Rate 
% 1997/98 to 
2001/02 
Per capita 
transfers 
(INR), 
2001/02 
     
Andhra Pradesh............................ 3,178.4 30.7 12.4 171.4 
Assam............................................. 162.4 29.7 16.7 65.1 
Bihar............................................... 555.9 62.0 -0.50 64.4 
Chattisgarh.................................... 1,262.4 50.1 - 323.3 
Goa ................................................ 94.1 33.6 11.0 258.6 
Gujarat........................................... 3,139.5 17.8 14.6 175.5 
Haryana.......................................... 789.2 39.5 18.6 135.5 
Himachal Pradesh........................ 278.7 58.5 0.7 472.6 
Jammu & Kashmir....................... 616.2 83.7 16.2 247.6 
Jharkhand...................................... 244.0 62.0 - 64.4 
Karnataka....................................... 6,085.9 51.9 14.5 347.7 
Kerala............................................. 1,794.9 44.5 3.4 296.9 
Madhya Pradesh........................... 3,766.3 54.8 -2.1 241.4 
Maharashtra................................... 9,417.7 13.8 22.8 239.6 
Manipur.......................................... 19.5 46.5 33.1 36.1 
Orissa............................................. 804.7 44.2 22.4 153.8 
Punjab............................................ 848.9 10.1 9.7 105.1 
Rajasthan........................................ 5,170.3 83.3 38.6 403.5 
Tamil Nadu ............................ 4,677.0 33.7 -2.8 180.7 
Tripura........................................... 110.0 83.5 5.6 297.8 
Uttranchal...................................... 510.5 63.7 - 250.1 
Uttar Pradesh................................ 7,748.8 74.5 14.4 232.1 
West Bengal................................... 5,020.3 54.3 14.1 256.7 
     
Average................................. 2,447.6 31.7 13.5 224.4 
 
                    Source: India’s Municipal Sector: A Study for the Twelfth Finance Commission, (2004) 
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Recent Municipal Bond Experience 
 
Municipalities in India have raised over INR 9 billion through taxable bonds, tax-free bonds and 
pooled financing.xii  As shown in Table 2, municipalities with investment grade ratings have successfully 
accessed credit markets.  But currently, municipal bond issuance is contingent on state government 
approval. 
 
Table 2: Municipal Bonds in India 
TAXABLE MUNICIPAL BONDS 
Year City Project Amount    (INR million) 
Interest Rate 
(%) 
1997 Bangalore  City Roads / Street Drains 1,250 13.00 
1998 Ahmedabad Water Supply / Sewerage 1,000 14.00 
1999 Ludhiana  Water Supply / Sewerage 100 14.00 
1999 Nashik Water Supply / Sewerage 1,000 14.75 
2000 Indore  City Roads 100 13.00 
2001 Nagpur  Water Supply 500 13.00 
2001 Madurai  City Roads 300 12.25 
     
TAX-FREE MUNICIPAL BONDS 
Year City Project Amount (INR million) 
Interest Rate 
(%) 
2002 Ahmedabad Water Supply / Sewerage 1,000 9.00 
2002 Nasik  Sewerage / Storm Water Drainage 500 N/A 
2003 Chennai – 
MWSSB 
Water Supply 
420 N/A 
2003 Hyderabad  Roads 825 N/A 
2003 Hyderabad - 
MWSSB 
Drinking Water  
500 9.00 
2003 Tamil Nadu - 
Pooled Fund 
Water Supply / Sewerage 
304 9.00 
2004 Ahmedabad Water Supply / Storm Water Drainage / 
Roads / Bridges and Flyover 
580 N/A 
2004 Visakhapatnam  Water Supply 500 7.25 
    
  Source: Vaidya and Vaidya, “Municipal Bonds in India: Experience So Far” 
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SECTION 2: THEORY OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 
 
Municipal bonds are issued by the municipality to raise capital for development projects. Usually 
the income earned from these bonds is tax exempt. These bonds are bought by investors who would like to 
reduce their tax liabilities. Thus there is dual benefit for the issuer and the investor as the issuer is able to 
raise capital at a lower costxiii and the investor is able to maximize one’s returns from investments post tax. 
The process is explained below. 
 
Figure 1: Municipal Bond Issuance Process 
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Project revenues 
service the debt held 
by the bond holders 
Development project 
creates social benefit 
for the public 
Municipality pledges 
future tax revenues 
to service its debt  
Municipality issues bonds 
(Returns on these bonds may 
be tax exempt) 
Bonds purchased by: 
1. High net worth individuals 
2. Profit-making funds 
The development project is 
financed and generates 
revenues 
Highlights 
 
• Filling financing gaps for development projects with 
net social benefits can help increase social welfare 
• Tax incentive increases investor interest 
• Self-regulatory mechanism is created by aligning 
the interests of the issuer and the investor 
• Revenue bond model is a self-financing cycle 
 
Downsides 
 
• Government foregoes tax revenues equal to the tax 
on interest earnings 
• Expectations of bailouts can lead to fiscal 
irresponsibility and subsequent insolvency General   
Obligation Bonds    Revenue Bonds 
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A Practical Example: Financing Water Infrastructure in Chennai  
 
In the drought-prone city of Chennai, water is an essential input to many industries as well as for 
households and agriculture.  As such, water availability is a key consideration in making decisions about 
locating industries in Tamil Nadu.  In the 1990s, as a result of a severe drought, major chemical and 
fertilizer plants located in the Chennai area stopped production for six months due to a lack of water.xvi  
This illustrates that the adequate and reliable provision of water will be an important factor in economic 
development in the drought prone city of Chennai and the state of Tamil Nadu.  With a limited supply of 
240 million liters per day in Chennai and a projected growth in demand, water infrastructure improvements, 
in addition to more efficient use of available water resources, are needed in Chennai.xvii  We illustrate this 
process through a stylized illustration of how a municipal bond could finance addition water infrastructure 
in Figure 2, using the assumptions below. 
 
Assumptions: 
1. Municipal bonds are floated to finance a water infrastructure project in Chennai, India. 
2. Cost of the project is INR 4 billion and is entirely funded by the issuance of municipal bonds and these 
bonds are fully subscribed. 
3. These bonds are revenue bonds whose debt is serviced from the project revenues.xviii 
4. Investors buy these bonds for diversification and reducing their tax liabilities. 
5. Investors could be retail or institutional and their preferences are the same. 
6. The marginal income tax rate for investors is 30%.  
7. The market interest rate on debtxix is 10%. 
8. Investors have their money in one or other forms of savings.xx  
9. The financial model for the proposed water infrastructure is a hypothetical one and does not represent 
any actual numbers. 
10. The bonds will be fully subscribed. 
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Cost of floating municipal bonds 
for Corporation of Chennai is equal 
to the market interest rate on debt 
(10%) less the percent tax savings  
on interest income (30% tax rate on 
10% earnings) 
 10% - (30% x 10%) = 7% 
 
Debt Service per year is 7% of  
INR 4 billion = INR 280 million 
Investors’ Objectives 
1. Diversifying Risk 
2. Increasing post tax returns 
Cost of Capital: 7% 
This is equivalent to the post-tax rate of 
return for investors. 
 
Debt Service: INR 280 million 
If project earns > INR 280 million 
(EBDIT), then bond holders can be paid 
with revenues.  Refer to Appendix 2. 
Tax subsidy calculation 
 Money held by bond holders will 
be parked in the savings, which 
would have at most paid 10% 
returns (Remember, we assumed 
cost of debt above as 10%). That 
means the investor would have 
earned 10% on INR 4 billion = INR 
400 million. This income would 
have been taxed by the government 
at 30%.  (30% of INR 400 million = 
INR 120 million). This tax is 
forgone by the GOI  by allowing the 
issuance of tax exempt municipal 
bond. 
Tax Subsidy: INR 120 million 
Government forgoes tax collection of tax 
benefit given to the bond holders, which 
is INR 120 million per year 
Corporation of Chennai issues INR 4 
billion of tax-free bonds within India 
Investors with large taxable income 
prefer to invest in these bonds as tax 
exempt nature on interest earnings 
reduces risk and offers 
diversification opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Municipal Bonds -- Chennai Water Infrastructure Financing 
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SECTION 3: DRIVING FORCES FOR MUNICIPAL BONDS 
 
For a municipality to raise capital and remain solvent, it needs to excel in its financial condition, 
have a good institutional framework, and a growing economy and tax base. These factors are used to 
analyze the credit worthiness of a municipality to take on additional decision-making responsibility 
regarding its level of debt. The framework below is used to analyze the potential for COC to issue 
municipal bonds to support its financial needs. 
 
FINANCIAL CLIMATE 
 
a) Credit Rating 
A good credit rating to attract investors and to minimize the interest rate on debt is critical to the 
viability of municipal bonds.  In addition, ratings of bonds on a continuous basis will enable investors to 
monitor the management efficiency of the municipal entities. An example of this effectiveness was 
demonstrated when the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (MWSSB), the water 
utility under the jurisdiction of the COC, made its entry into the municipal bond market in 2003-04 to issue 
of tax free bonds for an amount of INR 420 million. At that time the Board received a rating of AAxxi by 
CRISIL, an independent Indian bond rating agency like Standard and Poors. This rating depicted a strong 
stand-alone credit quality and low risk for the investor. This rating enabled Chennai MWSSB to issue 
bonds at a coupon rate of 5.20% for 7-year a tenure.  
 
b) Liquidity 
The Indian bond market -- for corporate and federal bonds – is fairly developed and has one of the 
highest bond issuance in the Asian region. Additional bond issuances by Chennai MWSSBxxii are likely to 
be absorbed by the market immediately. This is based on three points: 1) previous bond issues, as shown in 
Table 2, were fully subscribed, 2) the Indian bond market is quite large and developed (approximately INR 
12.7 trillion), and 3) household savings are mainly invested in banks – a liquid source for funding bonds 
(See Appendix A6).  
The key issue is how liquid the secondary bond market will be to trade these municipal bonds. The 
presence of a large base of corporate and federal bonds helps investors to trade these municipal bonds as 
interest rate spreadsxxiii to the existing bonds. This liquidity will help in ascertaining a fair price for these 
bonds and places a market mechanism to monitor the risk associated with these bonds relative to the 
treasury bonds issued by the central bank of India. The total outstanding bonds in India are approximately 
INR 12.7 trillion of which 70% are the government bonds. In terms of traded volume 95% of the bonds 
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traded are government bonds with strong preference to benchmark. This is evident from the fact that the 
only top five bonds dominate the total 40% of the daily trading volumexxiv.  
 
Figure 3: India’s Bond Market Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Source:  Deustche Bank Report, using Reserve Bank of India data. 
 
c) Investor Preferences 
The investors in these bonds are of two types: retail and institutional. Most retail investors will be 
high net worth individuals who will have a marginal tax rate of 30% and the institutional investors will be 
funds or corporations who will have a marginal tax rate of 35%xxv. Investors typically have a plethora of 
choices to invest in which includes, equity and debt instruments, treasury bills and municipal bondsxxvi. The 
returns on equity are high but are risky.  For the period 1991-2004 in India, the equity premium was 11.3% 
and the average volatility of returns was 37.7%.xxvii  In addition, debt instruments like a corporate bond 
could be attractive, but the returns are taxed.  The tax-free municipal bonds have a risk profile similar to the 
treasury billsxxviii because the issuer is a municipal entity, which is closely tied in to the governmentxxix.  
Although India offers a variety of instruments, the municipal bond will be one more product in the basket 
of financial instruments permitting investor to diversify risks.xxx 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CLIMATE 
 
a) Regulatory 
Although the regulatory mechanism for securities exchange is well set up in India, the regulatory 
framework for bonds is deficient. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) monitors the 
performance of institutions from a securities point of view.  India lacks an equivalent of the Municipal 
Securities Regulatory Board (MSRB) in the United States, which regulates all municipal bond issues.xxxi A 
similar institution needs to be created to ensure greater transparency, standardization, and clear stringent 
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penalties for violations to create a self-regulatory mechanism for the Indian bond market, including the 
municipal bond market. A self-regulatory mechanism could be fostered through standardized public 
reporting requirements and clear operational regulations that would enable investors and the general public 
to scrutinize municipal fiscal positions. Self-regulation also reduces the need for resource-intensive 
monitoring bodies. Thus, a rule-making body like MSRB could aid in efficient policy making and impact. 
 
b) Federalism  
Despite the seventy-fourth amendment intended to decentralize responsibilities to lower levels of 
government, the majority of the fiscal responsibility currently rests with the GOI. Per the constitution, tax 
collection and expenditures are managed in three main ways: 
a) GOI collects taxes and GOI decides expenditures 
b) GOI collects taxes and allocates a portion to states to decide expenditures 
c) State and municipalities collect taxes and decide on expenditures 
Since the majority of the taxes are collected by the GOI (a & b above), this means that municipal bodies 
have limited ability to determine expenditures, particularly since the state governments retain control on 
municipal access to raising capital and expenditure on capital investments.  
Decentralization also raises the issue of fiscal federalism and the role of the constitution. The case 
of fiscal responsibility with the states and local municipal bodies can be successful only if there are 
sufficient and necessary legal provisions to ensure investor protection and delinquency laws. Indian 
common law is still designed for a federal structure. The borrowing powers designed for only the center 
and there are no specific guidelines for the state. This is an important change that needs to be made to 
address before moving into complete fiscal decentralization.  
 
c) Political 
With India’s proportional representation electoral system, political impasses between the center and 
the state governments occur often. The friction between the different ruling parties in a state and the GOI 
can lead the predominance of the GOI’s political agendas over local priorities for development and sound 
financial decisions. This has been witnessed time and again. There are large numbers of political partiesxxxii 
whose agendas are very different from each other, especially in regard to support of municipal bonds. In 
addition, since municipal bonds are tax-free for investors who are usually high wage earners, tax-free bonds 
can be adamantly misinterpreted as being a boon for the rich in a pro-poor electorate. Thus, garnering 
political support and managing political risks is a key issue with municipal bonds. In addition, the ratings of 
the bonds are highly dependent on the political outcome, which may lead to higher volatility hence greater 
costs of capital for projectsxxxiii. 
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SECTION 4: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
Since data on municipal bonds is still scarce, we developed a model to better understand the 
ramifications of an expansion of municipal bonds in India. Treating a large municipality as a small and 
open economy, we construct a macroeconomic model (Refer to Appendix I for the construct of the model) 
in order to estimate “optimal” debt levels for a municipality. To do this, we obtain the debt dynamics for a 
municipality and subsequently value the price of such a debt using Merton’s continuous time approach.xxxiv 
Our approach to the economic analysis has been to develop a framework for analyzing the economic 
strength of a municipality and to value the debt in case the municipality decides to float the bond. 
 
OPTIMAL DEBT 
It is important for the municipality to recognize the sources of revenues and expenditures and 
understand how they would vary over time. In our model, we look at three sources of revenues namely, 
transfers from the GOI to the municipalities, tax collections for the municipality and aid or grants received 
directly. We also assumed that investments by the government are time variant but depend on the rate of 
change of capital stock. Using this framework we solve for an optimal capital stock, which leads us to an 
optimal debt level for the municipality. As mentioned in the Twelfth Finance Commission report, debt or 
debt to municipal GDP would not be a good measure (See Appendix I). xxxv  In addition, the median debt to 
GDP ratio for the states is 37% 
which by itself cannot be used as 
a benchmark. (See Figure 4). 
  
Instead, we use a ratio of 
debt to municipal tax revenue and 
propose that each municipality has 
a different optimum level of debt.  
Thus, GOI decisions regarding 
municipal debt based on a 
national average may not be 
appropriate given the variance.   
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Source: 12th Finance Commission Report
MEDIAN IS 37%
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VALUATION 
Valuation is key as municipal debt is new and we do not have much history to predict returns on 
this instrument. To overcome this barrier, we have used the continuous time frameworkxxxvi based on the 
expected value of deficit or surplus for the municipality. Thus we have priced this municipal bond as a 
contingent liability owned by the investors who faces a risk of municipality defaulting. Further, we have 
gone ahead and established the optimal amount of wealth that an investor would invest in municipal bonds 
assuming that the investors are risk averse (Refer to Appendix I). This model can estimate the demand 
function for municipal bonds as well as estimate an optimal supply level for the debt by the municipality. 
This model can help a policy-maker design, value, and create a debt instrument, which was non-existent 
earlier. 
 
DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL 
This valuation model helps us understand key characteristics of the municipal debt market before 
we make decision on accepting or rejecting municipal debt as a financing alternative. Firstly from the 
investor’s point of view it is useful in valuing the price of such a new instrument. Municipal debt will be 
new to the Indian market and the investors will be worried if they are paying the right price for this 
instrument especially since it has no history of returns. Our model can value this by just looking at expected 
fiscal situation of the municipality and knowing the risk free rate of return. The fiscal situation of a 
municipality can be obtained by looking at the credit rating and the corresponding interest rate differential 
as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 5: Bond Ratings and Yield Spreads in India 
 
Source:  CRISIL           Source:  India Infoline (March 22, 2005) 
 
Note: In this paper we recommend that for a municipality to obtain a SMZ status, AA rating is necessary. These ratings 
also signify the cost of capital that the municipality will eventually pay for floating a bond as shown above 
 
RATING SYMBOL DEFINITION
AAA HIGHEST SAFETY
AA HIGH SAFETY
A ADEQUATE SAFETY
BBB MODERATE SAFETY
BB INADEQUATE SAFETY
BB HIGH RISK
C SUBSTANTIAL RISK
D DEFAULT
SPECULATIVE GRADE BONDS
INVESTMENT GRADE BONDS
CRISIL'S RATING SCALE
 18  
Secondly, from a regulatory stand point, policy makers can estimate the gross demand for such new 
instruments in the market.  This can help policy makers plan necessary control mechanisms such that 
demand remains in place and does not affect the market and the economy in adverse ways. The demand 
estimation is key as the trend in savings is moving towards government securities away from pension funds 
and corporate stocks and bonds in India as shown in Figure 6. As these municipal bonds will be primarily 
funded by private savings, we looked at the household savings below.  
 
Figure 6: Distribution of Savings in India 
As of 08/30/2004
Table: Financial Saving of The Household Sector (Gross)(Percentage Distribution) 
Source: Reserve Bank of India
  2003-04 2002-03 2001-02 2000-01 1999-00
    
Financial Saving (Gross) 100.00             100.00             100.00             100.00             100.00             
a) Currency 10.10               8.50                 9.70                 6.30                 8.80                 
b) Deposits 42.90               41.50               39.40               41.00               36.30               
  i) with banks 40.50               36.30               35.30               32.50               30.80               
  ii) with non-banking companies 0.20                 1.60                 2.60                 2.90                 1.70                 
  iii) with co-operative banks and societies 2.30                 3.70                 3.60                 5.60                 4.30                 
  iv) trade debt (net) (0.10)               (0.10)               (2.10)               0.10                 (0.40)               
c) Shares and debentures 1.40                 1.60                 2.70                 4.10                 7.70                 
  i) private corporate business 0.70                 0.80                 1.50                 3.10                 3.40                 
  ii) co-operative banks and societies -                  -                  0.10                 -                  -                  
  iii) units of UTI (0.40)               (0.50)               (0.60)               (0.40)               0.80                 
  iv) bonds of PSUs -                  -                  -                  0.10                 0.10                 
  v) mutual funds (other than UTI) 1.10                 1.30                 1.80                 1.30                 3.40                 
d) Claims on government 17.70               18.60               17.90               15.70               12.30               
  i) investment in government securities 4.00                 4.30                 5.80                 1.70                 0.90                 
  ii) investment in small savings, etc . 13.70               14.30               12.10               14.00               11.30               
e) Insurance funds 14.90               15.50               14.20               13.60               12.10               
  i) life insurance funds 14.50               14.80               13.50               12.90               11.20               
  ii) postal insurance 0.10                 0.20                 0.30                 0.20                 0.30                 
  iii) state insurance 0.30                 0.50                 0.40                 0.50                 0.60                 
f) Provident and pension funds 13.00               14.30               16.10               19.30               22.80               
      (2.00)               (2.00)               (2.00)               (2.30)               (2.80)               
Note           
1. Figures in parentheses are percentages to GDP at current market prices.       
        
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
The table shows that the household savings moved into the government securities sector and bank deposits while the 
decrease was in the pensions and shares segment. Thus municipal bonds should see a good interest from the investors when 
launched. 
 
Thirdly, the model can estimate the effects of changes in tax collection efficiency, increase in 
government transfers and grants from external entities like the World Bank on the price of municipal debt. 
The model captures the elasticity of an increase in such alternate sources of income for the state versus 
value of the debt floating. This provides a tool for assessing the future solvency of municipalities.  For 
example, a municipality could request increases in transfers or aid by citing not only socio-economic 
benefits from such aid but also a potential positive balance sheet effectxxxvii. In addition, in building the 
model we assumed that aid and grants contributing towards revenue were constant. Indian municipalities 
have
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Figure 7: Distribution of Revenue for Corporation 
of Chennai for 2004-2005
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Source: Corporation of Chennai
Figure 8: Trends in Revenue Sources for Corporation of Chennai
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four types of revenue sources of which aids and grants are the least. A well-managed municipality like 
COC has lower dependence on assigned revenues or transfers compared to its counterparts. As shown in 
Figure 7, half of the revenues 
generated by COC are from mainly 
property taxes and entertainment 
taxes, and only one third is 
contributed by the transfers or 
assigned revenues. For fiscal 
decentralization, a key trend should 
be to continue to lower dependence 
on assigned revenues. In our model 
(Refer to Appendix I) we have 
shown that transfers decrease with 
an increase in bond issuance by the 
municipalities. To verify we looked 
at the municipality of COCover the last fifteen years and the share of transfers or assigned revenues has 
reduced from 50% to 33% of the total tax revenues, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Municipalities must move towards self revenue generation and rely less on transfers or assigned 
revenue sources as evidenced in COC here. (Refer to Table 1 on transfers for all states in India).  Figure 8 
shows that the percentage of aid and grants are almost constant.  
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Figure 9: Corporation of Chennai
Fiscal Accounts
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The model also establishes the debt level that a municipality can take on to follow a balanced 
growth path. It shows that in response to a positive economic shock such as an increase in productivity, the 
level of debt falls instantaneously. Thus if there was a negative economic shock, the debt levels increases 
but as municipality have to show a balanced budget at end of the year, the eventual effect is that the 
consumption shifts to a new permanent level. Hence, municipality has a higher debt to tax collection ratio 
which affects its rating and thus the future borrowing capacity.  To be utilizing this framework and monitor  
the dynamics above, it is necessary to have a good accounting system. This model’s predictability depends 
on fine tuning it with the data collected through proper measurement and accounting system which we 
found evident in the Chennai. COC has been able to show a balanced budget after moving towards the 
accrual method of accounting as shown in Figure 9 below. All the states in India use cash-based accounting 
system which leads to underestimating the expenditures. The merits of the accrual based system can be 
seen in the substantial decrease in the finance expenses after 2002 in Chennai. Figure 10 shows that finance 
expenses as a percentage of the total revenues decreased to almost 1.2%. Finance expenses are usually 
adjustment expenses written off to cover expenditures. As the cash based accounting system underestimates 
the expenditures, the finance expenses increase in the subsequent fiscal year. This can be brought down by 
accrual based accounting.  
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Figure 10: Accrual Accounting Effect.  
Figure 10: Accrual Based Accounting Efficiency
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In addition, this model provides useful insights for a small and open economy. Our objective was to 
provide a framework for assessing the dynamics of debt, quantifying an optimal debt level and valuing the 
debt. We assume in our model that all the debt floated by the municipality will be absorbed by the market 
as there is a substantial growth in the wholesale debt market in India (Refer to Figure 11) and also there is a 
strong preference for investors to move towards the government securities and deposits. (Refer to Figure 12 
and Figure 6). 
 
 Figure 11: Growth of Wholesale Debt Market in India  
Market Capitalisation Net Traded Value Average Daily Value Average Trade Size
INR billion INR billion INR billion INR million
2005-2006                    15,534                60,159                4,584                        18                       76 
2004-2005                    14,617              124,308                8,873                        30                       71 
2003-2004                    12,159              189,518              13,161                        45                       69 
2002-2003                     8,645              167,778              10,687                        36                       64 
2001-2002                     7,568              144,851                9,472                        33                       65 
2000-2001                     5,808                64,470                4,286                        15                       67 
1999-2000                     4,940                46,987                3,042                        10                       65 
1998-1999                     4,115                16,092                1,055                          4                       66 
1997-1998                     3,432                16,821                1,113                          4                       66 
1996-1997                     2,928                 7,804                   423                          1                       54 
1995-1996                     2,078                 2,991                   119                          0                       40 
1994-1995                     1,582                 1,021                     68                          0                       66 
Year Number of Trades
 Source: National Stock Exchange of India 
 
The market capitalization has grown by 10 times and average trade size by more than 100 times in the last ten years. 
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Figure 12: Skew towards Deposits and Government Securities  
 
 
Percentage of every 1INR saved
-
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
Currency
Deposits
Stocks and Bonds
Govt. Bonds
Insurance Funds
Pension Funds
2003-04
2002-03
2001-02
2000-01
1999-00
Source: Reserve Bank of India
 
 
In the last five years we have seen household savings towards government bonds and deposits which is why there is a skew 
above 
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SECTION 5: STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 
 
We have divided this section in assessing the threats and benefits for the stakeholders. The 
objective of this section is to analyze what the key issues that the stake holders shall be looking at and how 
that will affect the issuance of the municipal bonds from a stakeholder’s perspective.  
 
THREATS ANALYSIS 
 
While municipal bonds may look like an attractive and innovative means of financing and of 
enabling fiscal decentralization, it would not be wise to undermine the threats that could potentially harm 
the economy and the sustainability of municipal bonds. There are two major threats: institutional failures 
which result from regulatory and supervisory inadequacies and the threat of moral hazard. We have 
addressed both these issues by drawing upon two important case studies in the history of municipal bonds 
later in the section. Apart from those two main threats, we have identified other potential hazards which 
could impede municipal bond financing alternative. They can be primarily classified as either economic or 
institutional in nature. 
 
ECONOMIC THREATS 
1. Systemic Risk: While one can advocate that financially strong and well performing municipalities can 
issue debt based on their balance sheet, one should not forget that these municipalities still come under 
the aegis of the state government which means that while individual projects and municipalities might 
look efficient, under extra-ordinary conditionsxxxviii the performance of all these municipalities might 
get correlated leading to successive defaults resembling a contagion effect. Since the state government 
needs to contain this contagion, this might severely limit the borrowing capacity for the state 
government in the future. Thus risk diversification may not be completexxxix.  
 24  
 
2. Revenue Projection Errorsxl: In India, most of the taxes are collected by the GOI and only property 
taxes and smaller revenue sources are left to the state’s jurisdiction. As municipal bonds are valued 
based on the municipality’s expected revenue basexli, it is important that this stream of income is 
secure. Under the current conditions, this may not be true due to various reasons of which business 
cycle correlation is an important aspectxlii. Usually the property taxes and revenue sources fluctuate 
with business cycles and if that being true in India, it is difficult to predict the income streams for the 
municipalities. In addition most of the states and municipalities in India depend on the center for fiscal 
transfers as a significant percentage of their revenue base (Refer to Table 2).  
 
3. Non – Pareto Optimality: One of the arguments that Gordon (1983) makes is the lack of optimal 
allocation of the tax subsidy in the tax free municipal bonds.xliii The argument is that investors are both 
rich and poor. To achieve full subscription of the bonds, the government needs to attract the poor 
investors too. These poor investors expect greater returns and the government eventually has to oblige 
to their needs hence these municipal bonds give returns slightly above the market clearing rate. This 
higher return benefit is passed on to the rich investors as well. Since most of the investors in the tax-
free municipal bonds are rich the tax suboptimal pricing of these bonds benefits the rich.  
 
4. “Too Big To Fall”: The government is ultimately responsible for the municipal debt, thus  from an 
investor’s point of view, over a period of time, these municipal bonds will very closely resemble risk-
free treasury bonds though they differ in credit quality and seniority terms. The investor knows that 
government will need to bailout large municipal bond defaults. This means that the interest rate 
differential between the municipal bonds and treasury bonds is a subsidy given by the government to 
the municipality. In other words, the municipality earns free profit equal to the difference between the 
returns of municipal bonds and treasury bondsxliv.  
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INSTITUTIONAL THREATS 
1. Inconsistent Tax Policy: The municipal debt is issued tax exempt in most situations. In India, the 
income tax is collected by the GOI where as the municipal debt is floated by the local government. 
Hence there is a mismatch between revenue responsibility and debt issuance. The absence of a state 
income tax system could be a potential threat in exacerbating the moral hazard problem and a cause for 
lack of effective control on revenues and expenditures for both the state and GOI.  
 
2. “Black Bonds”: In some ways, these municipal bonds being tax free can be thought of a bond which 
attracts “black money”, illegal untaxed money. Thus, if the source of the funds which were used to buy 
these bonds are not checked then it is in a way attracting the “black money” holders to invest in these 
bonds. This throws in the case of setting a bad precedent for the honest tax payers who would think of 
this tax exemption as a penalty for them. This could send a wrong signal to law abiding citizens and 
could thereby potentially lead to higher rate of tax evasion. 
 
3. Political Malpractice: The democratic system in India which is so often prided upon can be misused to 
divert funds and also endorse financially and socially unworthy projects. In addition, under the Indian 
multiparty political system, if there are elections on the horizon there is always a threat of mis-
application of funds through the issuance of bonds. This money could be used in wasteful projects for  
the purpose of attracting voter’s interest.  
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Case Study I: Orange County Regulatory Failure xlv 
 
Orange County is an important case to understand the regulatory and supervisory failurexlvi, which led 
to unchecked investment extravagance by the county’s chief treasurer. The result was unpleasant as the county 
declared the largest municipal bankruptcy in the history of United States. Orange county is the second most 
populous county in California and also the fifth most populous county in USA with a population of 
3,056,865xlvii. The county has many sources of revenues including the famous Disney parks which put them 
into a financially strong municipality to borrow. Given this stature, the county treasurer invested $ 7.4xlviii 
billion of funds in interest rate sensitive products, which resulted in losses as the FED hiked up interest rates, 
and the fund lost close to $1.6 billion dollars.   
The main reason for this well funded municipality which had enormous tax base and large revenue 
streams was due to the mis-management of funds by the county treasurer. The treasurer invested the funds 
available to him in volatile instrumentsxlix, which earned good returns. This led a monitoring and regulatory 
failure to check the treasurer’s investment strategies resulting in staggering losses. This is a key lesson to learn 
as in municipal financing, the individual municipality such as COC might be performing well, but the overall 
state or city government’s politics and economics can affect the functioning of the system. A good regulatory 
and monitoring system is thus vital to the performance of the municipal bond financing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salient Features 
 In December 1994 the Orange county in California was forced to declare bankruptcy as the investment pool had 
suffered a loss of $ 1.6 billion 
 The key reason for bankruptcy was cited as the mis-management of funds by the county treasurer Bob Citron. 
 The aggressive investment strategy followed by the treasurer who was supposed to manage risks led to the failure of 
the county’s fiscal performance. 
 The political pressure from the voters to minimize taxes also helped the deficit to balloon to unmanageable levels. 
Lessons Learned 
 Constant regulatory checks are needed to protect investors from losing interest in future bond issues 
 Lender of the last resort: Generally in such big and municipal failures, the federal bank has to bail out the county 
which leads to moral hazard and dilution of self regulation on the part of investors 
 Such bankruptcies throw in important questions of who needs to be protected first: 1) The investors in such bonds or 
2) the county so that public service is not hindered. This is a tricky question always in front of the federal 
government in these mis-haps 
 
 27  
 
 
Case Study II: Brazil - Moral Hazard of Fiscal Federalisml 
 
Expectations of federal government bailouts of state defaults constituted a moral hazard problem, 
resulting in an excessive bond issuance at the state level in Brazil.  The domestic investors’ implicit 
assumption of federal guarantees on state debt permitted states to raise capital through their bond market 
beyond fiscally responsible levels.  
In the late 1980’s, the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janerio, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, along 
with others, faced severe problems in servicing their obligations on their state bonds.  In response to 
precarious state finances, the credit market demanded higher interest rates and shorter maturities.  The 
financial risks of holding state debt eventually grew to the point that private investors refused to hold state 
debt.    
On the verge of default, the states turned to the federal government for a bailout.  Concerned that state 
defaults could have a ripple effect and destabilize the entire domestic capital market, triggering bank runs and 
undermining credibility, the federal government responded with the so-called troca arrangement, whereby the 
states were authorized to exchange their state bonds for federal bonds.   
Under this scheme, the Central Bank assumed responsibility for the state bonds by floating the 
corresponding amount of new Central Bank bonds and then transferring them to the states.  The Senate 
subsequently authorized 100% rollovers for most indebted states as well as the capitalization of accumulated 
interest into the outstanding stock of bond debt at each rollover.  While Congressional representation of the 
most indebted states was only 12 of 81 seats, representatives colluded to protect the interests of the large 
indebted states in exchange for proportionate benefits for the other states. 
Given that the interest rate on the federal bonds remained high, the capitalization of interest triggered a rapid 
growth in the total stock of state debt.  By September 2001, 84% of the state debt was held by the central 
government.   
Due to moral hazard, the Ministry of Finance was reluctant to grant debt relief.  However, because the 
largest indebted states were also the most fiscally autonomous, the central government found itself with 
limited leverage over the states when renegotiating the debt structure.   
 
 
 
 
 Case Study II: Brazil - Moral Hazard of Fiscal Federalismli (continued) 
 
As a result of the financial crises and subsequent debt negotiations between the states and federal government, 
several reforms were eventually instituted: 
 
• Adjustment targets, including scheduled declines in debt-revenue ratios, increases in primary balance, 
growth in own-source revenues, and limits on investments. (Law 9496 of 1997)lii 
• Hierarchical mechanisms designed to limit states’ access to credit, including restrictions on new bond 
issues and prohibition of borrowing by jurisdictions without positive primary balances in previous 12 
months. (Senate Resolution 78; 1998)liii 
• Autonomy and discretion to National Monetary Council to prohibit lending to states violating resolutions.    
(Resolution 2653)liv 
• Prohibition of debt swap and other bail-out mechanisms and greater transparency of central bank 
operations. (Fiscal Responsibility Law, May 2000; Penal Law for Fiscal Crimes, October 2000)lv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bailouts 
 Given the large municipal bond debt, the federal government intervened fearing the 
destabilization of the entire domestic market. 
 Common knowledge that some states are “too big to fail” reinforced moral hazard.   
 Although the largest debtor states only held 12 of 81 seats, the representatives from less 
indebted states negotiated proportionate benefits in exchange for protection of large debtor 
states interests.  Result has been unchecked spending and debt relief.   
Moral Hazard 
Fiscal irresponsibility resulted from: 
 Investors continuing to purchase bonds under the implicit assumption of government 
guarantee. 
 States issuing more debt than was sustainable under expectations of federal government 
bailout. 
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BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
Assuming that productive development projects are not being implemented due to insufficient 
transfers from the GOI, municipal bonds offer a mechanism by which such projects could be financed.  It is 
critical that every project be evaluated closely to evaluate the financial viability and net economic benefits.  
Assuming that the project offers large net social welfare benefits, some of the potential benefits of the 
municipal bond financing are outlined below. 
 
Economic and Social Benefits:   
If municipal bond financing permits investment in productivity enhancing projects, in particular those 
that would not be implemented by the private sector alone due to coordination failureslvi, then productivity 
gains which would not have otherwise been realized may be achieved.  Also, independent municipal financing 
can free up resources for the government to redistribute capital more equitably across states and 
municipalities. Productive investments have the potential of creating employment as well as improving the 
provision of services to the population. 
The diagram below (Figure 4) helps illustrate the potential redistribution possibilities.  Assume that the 
government has limited resources to distribute among municipalities and that all productive projects cannot be 
financed.  In part (a) of the diagram below, if municipalities MA2 and MB2 would both like to implement a 
project requiring INR 100 million but were only allocated INR 50 million each, the projects are constrained by 
access to finance.  In this case, assume that the municipality MA2 has adequate credibility and the institutional 
capacity to access the private credit market while MB2 does not.  In part (b), if MA2 issues a 100 million tax-
free bond, the GOI forgoes the tax on the interest income the domestic investors earned on the tax-free bond.  
At a tax rate of 30% and interest rate of 10%, the tax foregone would be INR 3 million.  The government 
could then reallocate the 50 million originally designated to MA2 less the 3 million in foregone tax revenues to 
MB2.  In this way, the government can permit a greater number of municipalities to finance development 
projects.  This scheme allows well performing municipalities to raise capital independently while freeing up 
resources for less developed municipalities.   
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Figure13: Potential Redistribution of Transfers (a stylized example, in INR million) 
a) Initial allocation of transfers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Potential redistribution with municipal bond issueslvii 
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THE ACTUAL BENEFITS 
 
Black Money:   
A tax-free bond has the potential of attracting illegal ‘black moneylviii’ into the formal financial market.  
The amount of ‘black money’ in India is estimated at 20 to 25% of national incomelix.   Since an investor 
holding ‘black money’ does not pay taxes on it, tax-free bonds would offer an opportunity for such an investor 
to secure returns at a low level of risk in the formal market.  Since the GOI did not collect tax on this ‘black 
money’ to start with, it would not forgo additional tax revenues.  In other words, tax-free bonds have the 
potential of bringing illegal money into the formal financial system to raise capital for a municipality without 
any incremental losses in income tax revenueslx.  (The potential negative externality of greater tax evasion was 
discussed earlier in the threats analysis)  
 
Fiscal Responsibility:   
Greater fiscal independence to well performing municipalities can provide incentives for greater fiscal 
responsibility.  Since a municipal government should be better informed of the constraints and opportunities of 
the local economy, devolving decision making to municipal governments may facilitate better allocation of 
resources.  Since a municipality’s ability to access private markets in the future is dependent on the strength of 
their balance sheets, it is in the interest of a municipality to maintain solvency.  Thus, creating greater 
flexibility for municipalities that have already demonstrated sound fiscal management has the potential of 
engendering more responsible decision-making when investing in projects vis-à-vis with funds transferred 
from the state or GOI.   (The potential for moral hazard and fiscal irresponsibility has been addressed in the 
threats analysis section) 
 
No Balance Sheet Effect:   
Since the municipal bonds are entirely domestic debt, these municipal bonds would avoid the potential 
for a balance sheet effect associated with debt denominated in international currencies.  A large devaluation 
would not create a currency mismatch with this domestic currency denominated municipal bonds nor threaten 
the net worth of municipalities. 
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Table 3 Summary of Stakeholder Analysis 
 
  Benefits Stakeholder   Threats Stakeholder 
     
Increased investments Municipality  Systemic risk Government 
Incentive based wealth 
transfer Government  
Sub-optimal subsidy 
strategy Government 
Tax free status Society/investors  Black money Society 
Market based 
intervention Government  Economic shocks Government 
Economic 
Black money Government    
     
Fiscal decentralization Municipality  Moral hazard Government 
Self regulation Government  Municipal inefficiency Government 
Greater checks on 
municipality Society    
Institutional 
Ratings for 
municipality Government    
     
Keeps parties under 
check Society  Political mal-practice Society 
Performance 
advertising Municipality  
Mis-use of bond 
proceeds Society/investors 
Political 
Greater incentives for 
tax collection Municipality  
Overuse of municipal 
bonds Government 
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SECTION 6: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Granting greater discretion to municipalities regarding bond issuance involves both significant 
opportunities and risks (as summarized in the previous section).  Thus, the challenge will be to minimize the 
identified risks while ensuring that the necessary institutional capacity exists at municipal, state, and national 
levels.  We propose a pathlxi for approaching the issue of municipal debt issuance in India. Well performing 
municipalities should be screened and they should be allowed to become financially self-sustainable. In any 
case we believe that before the government of India allows any municipality to issue bonds, there are few key 
issues that need to be addressed. Our recommendations on those fundamental changes are listed below: 
 
Municipal Securities Board of India 
We propose the creation the Municipal Securities Board of India (MSBI), which shall regulate and monitor the 
municipal market in Indialxii. This body shall be a part of the existing Securities Board of India (SEBI).  
 
Transfer Policy 
Once MSBI is created and the SMZlxiii status is granted to the municipality, the GOI should reduce the state 
transfers as the municipality has alternate sources of financing and also this keeps in check the ratio of debt to 
revenues of the municipality. We base this argument on the economic model we developed as shown in 
Appendix 1, that can calculate the actual reduction in transfers for every INR of bonds floated assuming a 
given probability of municipality defaulting.  
 
Bankruptcy 
In India the municipal bankruptcy laws lxiv  need to be made clear and well defined as they are for the 
corporations. This change can be brought about by MSBI. In addition regulatory mechanisms should be able to 
aid development of the secondary municipal bond markets where a market mechanism to exchange risklxv 
would be created and default risk can be pricedlxvi.  
 
Taxation 
As analyzed in our model the tax rate plays an important rolelxvii. Thus we propose that any debt issuance by 
the municipality shall be tax free only on the interest income and shall not be tax free on the capital gains. In 
addition, the sources of funds used to buy these bonds need not be disclosed.  
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Insurance 
In addition the government should encourage the issuance of revenue bonds over general obligation bonds as 
the revenues act as an additional level of self insurance against any potential default. The government should 
also allow private firms to insure these bonds for risk mitigation and credit enhancement.  
 
Exchange Based Listing 
The municipal bonds should be listed on the National Exchanges. It is important that these municipalities are 
under the scrutiny of the investors on a daily basis and listing will increase liquidity. Private and over the 
counter market trading should be discouraged initially as regulating two parallel markets will be difficult in 
this new industry. 
 
Municipal Swap Curve 
The National Stock Exchange was able to create a zero coupon yield curve for the Indian debt market. 
Similarly it is important that a national swap rate for the municipal bond market is created. This will help 
increase the liquidity in the market and will create many avenues for the issuer and investor to lay off risks 
through a market based mechanism.  
 
Arbitration 
Legal systems in India mainly cater to the corporate bond market. This system needs to be extended to the 
municipal bonds and detailed rule book should be created. This is important to address the cases of bankruptcy 
and default charges. 
 
Classification 
Government should allow only competitive issues as the negotiated bond issues have considerably higher net 
interest costlxviii. Separately, the government of India should give additional incentives to municipalities to 
raise capital in under invested areas such as education, women’s health etc.  
 
Revenue Transfers 
The government of India should follow a phased reduction of transfers to the states. This fiscal 
decentralization should be able to able to fill in the gap created by the reduction in transfers. This phased 
approach can then lead to optimalitylxix. Incentives such as lump sum transfers as discussed above then will be 
a bonus to the municipalities. 
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SPECIAL MUNICIPAL ZONES 
 
We propose that Government of India establish the designation of Special Municipal Zone (SMZ), 
which will authorize select municipalities greater discretion in raising debt based on the merits of their balance 
sheet. By establishing a benchmark for municipal fiscal performance, the government can encourage other 
municipalities to perform well. 
  The government of India should invite applications from interested municipalities who meet the SMZ 
criteria proposed below. The government of India should scrutinize these applications and award qualified 
candidates the status of SMZ. The municipality will have the responsibility of demonstrating compliance with 
the criteria annually in order to maintain the SMZ status. To do this we propose the creation of a new Office of 
Municipal Finance within the Capital Markets Division of the Ministry of Finance - Department of Economic 
Affairs. This office shall report into the Joint Secretary of Capital Markets. The onus of getting the SMZ status 
lies with the municipality. They shall prepare a report elaborating their qualification. The report shall be 
approved by the Joint Secretary of Capital Markets based on the four criteria shown below.  
 
1. Independent credit rating of AA or better: We propose that two independent rating agencies 
evaluate each municipality on a monthly basis, one appointed by the municipal government and the 
other by the GOI.  If discrepancies arise, we recommend using the more conservative rating. 
Eventually we believe that the bond issuance’s success depends on it qualitylxx.  
 
2. Transparent double-entry accrual accounting practiceslxxi: The use of double entry – accrual based 
accounting systemlxxii should be made mandatory by the GOI whether the municipalities intend to use 
the SMZ scheme or not. This will create greater standardization and benchmarking across the nation. 
COC is the only municipality in India which uses this system.  
 
3. Municipalities should maintain an optimal debt to tax collection ratio: Based on our economic 
model, a municipality should calculate the optimal debt d*lxxiii as a ratio of its tax collection revenues. 
Note that we do not propose any target number at this time because lxxiv  we believe that each 
municipality has a unique optimum. If the existing ratio exceeds the optimal ratio the municipality 
should be disqualified from being awarded a SMZ status. This optimality should be maintained for the 
last three consecutive years before the SMZ status application can be made.  
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4. Why Municipal Debt? The municipality also should be able to demonstrate that raising capital 
through debt issuance is the best route to finance its development needs. They should be able to 
compare the benefits of issuing bonds versus alternate financing techniques such as loans, public-
private partnerships, grants etc.  
 
This methodology will establish the list of the special municipal zones in the country and create a standard 
guideline for borrowing powers which is currently absent in India. These recommended changes and the 
creation of Special Municipal Zones should be able to place Indian municipalities in the space of a new and 
sustainable financing mechanism. We believe that overall this decentralization of fiscal responsibilities would 
be ideal for the growing financing needs and development of Indialxxv. 
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APPENDIX I:  The Economic Model for Municipal Bonds 
  
DEMAND SIDE 
 
INVESTORS DILEMMA 
As an investor, we evaluate three things in relation to municipal bonds. Firstly, the value of such a security 
called municipal bond, secondly the optimal allocation of savings into this new asset class and thirdly the 
demand for municipal bonds. The sections below will illustrate this approach.  
 
SECTION 1: MUNICIPAL DEBT VALUATION 
 
The framework we chose here is to first analyze the value of these bonds and then establish a demand 
function. We assume that the COC issues zero coupon bonds value of b which matures at time T. These bonds 
are unsecured and the COC would pay back at the end of maturity INR b. In addition, we assume that the COC 
does not issue any debt later and if it does then the debt b is senior to future debt issues. In case of default, the 
bond holders only get net reserves that the Corporation has which will be equal to the Sum of Revenues Less 
Sum of Expenditures (We call it Vtlxxvi ). The bond holders cannot hold claim to the fixed assets of the 
Corporation.  
 
Thus at time T, bondholders get min {Vt, b}…………………………………………………………………. (i) 
Further we assume that the municipal bond security follows a random walk hence the security can be 
represented by the form  
dVt = (µdt + σdz)Vt …………………………………………………………………………….. …………......(ii) 
Where µ is the instantaneous return, σ is the instantaneous volatility and dz is a wiener processlxxvii.  
Now to determine the price of a security such that the pay off is as shown by (i), we use the differential 
equationlxxviii.  
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 38  
Thus we solve equation (iii) subject to the following boundary conditions. f is the price of the security which 
has the payoffs as shown below which in our case is the bond. 
 
a. F(Vt,T) = Min {Vt,b} 
b. F(Vt,t)/ Vt 1≤  
c. F(0,t)  = 0 
Here we assume the risk free interest rate to be rf and there are no coupon payments as it is a zero coupon 
bond. To solve this differential equation with boundary conditions, we assume Vt = ln Yt and substitute for τ = 
T – t. The equation (iii) becomes  
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The boundary conditions then become f(Yt, t) = min ),( be tY  
Assuming that equation four has the solution of the form  
f(Yt,t)= )()1( ,2,1 ∏∏ −+− trtY bee t τ .………………………………………………………………………..(v) 
 
Let’s divide the R.H.S into two parts namely part 1: )1(
,1∏− tYte  and part 2: )( ,2∏− tr be τ  
Subject to 
beT tY ≥
=∏ 1,1  and beT tY ≥=∏ 1,2  
We start with substituting for part 1, hence the partial differential equation simplifies to  
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The solution for this equation is given by standard mathematical results which is 
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Similarly solving for part 2 we get the partial differential equation as  
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The solution for this equation is obtained as above which is 
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Therefore substituting for Yt and τ we get the value of the security f. 
Thus f (V, t) = )( tTrbe −−
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This shows the value of the municipal bond at time t and it captures the risk of the municipality. We did not 
assume any utility function for the investor to price this security as it is not required.  
 
SECTION 2: OPTIMAL ALLOCATION PROBLEM 
In this section we estimate what would be the optimal fraction of an investor’s income that she would allocate 
to purchasing municipal bonds. We have developed the approach used by Piros (1987). We use the price of the 
municipal bond as calculated from the earlier section. Let f (Vt, t) be price P1 which has returns µm and risk of 
σm. Also let us assume that price of another security be P2 with returns µAlt and risk σAlt. We have assumed that 
all investors are risk averse or chose a mean-variance portfolio which means that the investor tries to minimize 
risk for given returns or maximize returns for a given amount of risk. In addition we have assumed that the 
marginal tax rate t’ for the investors is an increasing function.  
 
Let α be the proportion of savings that the investor invests in municipal bond and 1-α be the proportion of 
savings in alternate assets. The returns from the municipal bonds are tax exempt but the returns from the 
alternative investments are taxable. Let us further assume that at any given time t, the pre tax income for the 
investor is ipre and savings are st.. We also assume that savings are invested in only these two asset classes.  
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Hence the Net Income for the investor post taxes = Income pre tax + returns from municipal bonds + returns 
from alternative assets Less taxes paid which mathematically means, 
 
})1({)1( ' µαµαµα tpreAlttmprepost sitssii −+−−++= …………………………………………………….(ix) 
 
The investor wants to maximize this expected return which can be denoted as ( )[ ]postiUE   
Subject to })1({)1( ' AlttpreAlttmtprepost sitssii µαµαµα −+−−++=  
We can optimize this using a standard LaGrange  
L:  ( )[ ]postiUE  + λ [ })1({)1( ' AlttpreAlttmttpre sitssi µαµαµα −+−−++ ]……………………………. ……..(x) 
To calculate the optimal allocation in municipal bonds we take the first derivative of L with respect to α and 
equate it to zero. 
 
}]{[ ''''' AlttAlttmt stssUE
L µµµ
α
+−=
∂
∂
>  = 0 if 0<α<1 
For ,1≥α 0}]{[ ''''' ≥+− AlttAlttmt stssUE µµµ  
For ,0=α 0}]{[ ''''' ≤+− AlttAlttmt stssUE µµµ  
 
If we know that the expected utility function is strictly concave in α then, we can say that investor prefers a 
unique combination of the two asset classeslxxix. We also know that since the investor is risk averse, she would 
invest in the municipal bonds only if there was an embedded premium in the returns, otherwise the investor 
would have been risk neutral. Thus from this optimization problem we can determine α. Hence at time t, if we 
know the savings st and income ipre then it is possible to find the proportion of savings that will be invested in 
municipal bonds which we call it wt.  
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SECTION 3: ESTIMATION OF DEMAND FOR BONDS 
 
Now that we have estimated the price of such a security and the wealth that an investor would allocate in this 
good, we can find the individual demand function using the basic microeconomic theory. Given the vectors 
price and wealth, we can arrive at the indirect utility function ),( wpv . We know that this has a property 
0
'
''
≥
−
v
v
as the investor is risk averse. In addition we can find the individual demand function for investor i, 
as ix . The individual demand function can be established from the Roy’s Identity which is 
w
wpv
p
wpv
x ii
∂
∂
∂
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−= ),(
),(
………………………………………………………………………………………….(xi) 
Hence we can estimate the aggregate demand function for municipal bonds as ∑ ix  
 
THE SUPPLY SIDE 
 
Municipal Bonds leads to increase in indebtedness hence it is important to analyze what would be the 
optimum level of bond issuance. We develop this model below for an Indian Municipality to solve for the 
optimal debt level. The objective of this model is to represent different scenarios like shocks, fall in tax 
revenues etc and how COC’s fiscal stability be affected.   
The budget constraint is constructed with the aid of the following details for the municipality 
 
Source of funds for the Municipality 
1. Tax revenue per capita (τt) collected on output at tax rate βlxxx. 
2. Transfers from GOI (zt) to municipality (via state government) 
3. Bonds (dt) 
4. Aid (lt) 
 
Expenditure of funds for COC 
1. Interest on bonds (rlxxxidt) 
2. Government expenditures (gt) 
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Assumptions 
i) We assume a Cobb Douglas production function for output. 
ii) We further assume that there is no population growth hence L is constant 
The government tries to maximize the welfare of its citizens hence its objective function will be 
Max dtecU tt
ρ−
∞
∫
0
)(  
Subject to the constraint,  
tttttt lzgrdd −−−+= τ& …………………………………………………………………………………...xii 
d& , the rate of change of Chennai’s debt reflects if the economy is running surplus or deficit. Further  trd is the 
interest earned on the debt, tg is the government purchases or the investment in the economy,τ t is the tax 
revenues, tz is the transfers from central or state government to COC and tl is the aid coming in from other 
institutions. For simplicity, we will assume that tl is constant and the tax base τ t is a fraction β times the 
output of the economy.  
We also assume that the investor is risk averse hence the utility function is assumed to be tt ccU log)( = . This 
is because with a log utility function, the consumer is risk averse since rA=
u
u
′
′′′
−
 > 0 according to the Arrow-
Pratt measure.   
Thus the optimizing problem for the government becomes, 
H: [ ]ttttttt lzgrddtec −−−++−
∞
∫ τλ
ρ
0
)log(  ………………………………………………………………..xiii 
Further we assume that the government expenditures are in the form of investments and this is equal to the rate 
of change of capital stock. Again to simply the solution, we assume that there is no depreciation of capital. 
Thus, 
ttt kig &== ……………………………………………………………………………………………………xiv 
The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglass hence, the tax base will be ),( LKft ⋅= βτ  such 
that {0<β<1), where αα −⋅= 1),( LKALKf  and αAkkf =)( , and the marginal product of capital, 
1−
=
ααAkf k . We get this by dividing the entire equation by L as it is constant since n, the population growth 
is assumed constant.  
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Substituting these in the budget constraint I, we get  
ttttt lzAkirdd −−−+=
αβ&  …………………………………………………………………………………xv 
and optimization problem becomes 
H: [ ]tttttt lzAkirddtec −−−++−
∞
∫
αρ βλ
0
)log(  ………………………………………..……………………xvi 
To solve this firstly we define inter-temporal elasticity of substitution as σ = 
tCu
u
''
'
, then we know that  λ& / λ = 
-
t
t
c
c&
x σ -1, Substituting these we get ρ−= r
c
c
t
t&
…………………………………………………………...…xvii 
And the solution for this equation is trot ecc
)( −−
=
ρ
. Note that ρ is the rate at which investors or consumers 
discount the future 
 
We now proceed to look at the optimization problem and apply the Hamiltonian boundary conditions. 
1. 1==
di
dHλ …………………………………………………………………………………………………(a) 
2. 01 =−=−= −ααβρλρλλ kA
dk
dH
& 
1−
−=
ααβρλ kA&  ………………………………………………....(b) 
Thus dividing equation (b) by (a) and equating to VI, we get ραβρ α −=− − rkA 1  

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rk . This is optimal capital stock, which we substitute into the production function to get the 
output, 
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rAkf . Hence the tax revenues are now *)(* kf⋅= βτ  and the investment is i*.  
 
To obtain optimal debt, we substitute these in the constraint and get ttttt lzkAirdd −−−+=
αβ *)(& . 
 
This is a linear differential equation which can be solved as  
tttttt lzkAirdd −−−=−
αβ )(&  
dtelzkAiedd rt
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Applying the TVC we get the LHS. 
0])([lim
0
≤⋅−−−+= −
∞
−
∞→ ∫ dtelzkAided
rt
tttto
rt
TT
αβ  
Solving for do: 
dteilzkAd rttttto
−
∞
−++≤ ∫ ])([
0
αβ ………………………………………………………………………….xix 
In other words we can describe this as saying that the initial level of debt for COC has to be less than or equal 
to the present value of future net income streams which includes, transfers, tax collections and grants and aid 
net of all investments.  Thus, we arrive at the demand and supply side of the municipal market. With these 
equations xviii and xix with can estimate the effects of shocks on the bond holdings and deficit. Also this 
model can be simplified further to suit the needs of specific municipality if we can establish a relationship of 
transfers and tax rates over time.  
 
Thus in our model, we derived the demand side for the municipal bonds without having a history of average 
returns or taking into account the investor preferenceslxxxii. In addition the supply side of the model was 
derived from an inter-temporal approach. This demand and supply side should be able to give an unique 
equilibrium for every municipality by plugging in the relevant data and factors. 
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APPENDIX II:  Financial Analysis of Proposed Desalinization Plantlxxxiii 
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END NOTES 
                                                 
i
 One of the best performing municipalities, Venkatachalam (2005) 
ii
 Part 3(g) of the 74th Amendment calls for “the devolution by the State Legislature of powers and 
responsibilities upon the Municipalities with respect to preparation of plans for economic development 
and social justice, and for the implementation of development schemes as may be required to enable them 
to function as institutions of self-government.” 
iii
 Chetan Vaidya and Hitesh Vaidya, Indo-USAID FIRE Project (Municipal Bonds in India: Experience 
So Far, 2004 draft) 
iv
 Mather and Thakur, pg 52. 
v
 Ibid. 
vi
 12th Finance Commission Report. 
vii
 Briscoe. 
viii
 Brisco. pg 6. 
ix
 http://indiabudget.nic.in (estimated required funds of INR 537 billion and likely availability of funds of 
INR 358 billion) 
x
 Vaidya and Vaidya. 
xi
 World Bank, India: Urban Governance and Finance Review, Annex III, p 66. 
xii
 Vaidya and Vaidya. 
xiii
 Lower cost arises due to tax exemption given to the investors hence the cost of capital reduces for the 
municipality 
xiv
 General Obligation Bonds: A bond secured by a pledge of the issuer's taxing powers (limited or 
unlimited). More commonly the general obligation bonds of local governments are paid from ad valorem 
property taxes and other general revenues.  
xv
 Revenue Bonds: A municipal bond whose debt service is payable solely from the revenues derived 
from project acquired or constructed with the proceeds of the bonds 
xvi
 Briscoe, p 29. 
xvii
 Vackayil. 
xviii
 To see the revenue model, please refer to Annexure 1 on the financial model for the water project as 
an illustrative example 
xix
 Cost of Debt here is assumed to be the Prime Lending Rate and for illustrative purposes we have 
assumed it to be 10% per annum 
xx
 See Figure 6 for the type of savings that Indian Investors have 
xxi
 See Figure 5 for Bond Rating System in India and significance of AA rating 
xxii
 Urban Finance (2002) 
xxiii
 Interest rate spreads can be constructed such that municipal bonds trade either at a discount or a 
premium to the more liquid Government of India bonds 
xxiv
 Deutsche Bank’s report on Indian Bond Markets.  
xxv
 Note that we have used 30% as the tax rate for both individuals and corporations to keep our estimates 
conservative for calculation purposes.  
xxvi
 See Figure 6 on savings which illustrates how Indian households have parked their savings in different 
instruments 
xxviiMehra ( 2006) 
xxviii
 Risk as measured by volatility for Indian Treasury bills are approximately 1.73%, see Mehra (2006) 
xxix
 Municipality is tied into the government which indirectly means that the government is the lender of 
the last resort. Hence we go on in paper to illustrate the effects of this moral hazard and prescribe an 
optimal debt issue 
 51  
                                                                                                                                                                            
xxx
  Thus, investor preferences will be such that they will maximize the returns while minimizing the risk 
while achieving optimality on their utility function.  Mathematically Utility = U (t, CA, CM) where t is 
time and CA are the returns from all other alternative assets and CM are returns from municipal bonds. The 
budget constraint will be the total invest-able wealth held by the individual or a firm. We will optimize 
the investor’s utility maximization problem as shown in the model in this paper 
xxxi
  
xxxii
 We interviewed T.N.Seshan, the former chief election commissioner of India and a Kennedy School 
alumnus who opined that it was constitutionally wrong to restrict the number of parties  
xxxiii
 Greater political risk leads to greater volatility which means the cost of debt will increase even if the 
interest rates do not change. The assumption here the debt follows the Brownian motion model 
dPD=(µdt + σdz)PD, which is usually true. An increase in volatility σ increases dPD / PD (% change in the 
price of debt) hence cost of capital goes up.  
xxxiv
 Merton (1973) 
xxxv
 Finance Commission (2004) 
xxxvi
 Merton (1973) 
xxxvii
 Here, a positive inflow of aid will increase the price of the debt or reduce the bond holdings for the 
municipality thus having a positive effect on its balance sheet. See the valuation of model in appendix 1 
for details 
xxxviii
 We are referring to shocks and crisis 
xxxix
 This is like saying that one invests in different stocks like IBM, GE, GM etc but all of them fall under 
one asset class called equities. Thus no diversification is achieved despite investment in different 
securities 
xl
 Virtue (1949) 
xli
 See our economic model – valuation of municipal bond in the appendix 1 
xlii
 Virtue (1949) 
xliii
 Gordon 
xliv
 A similar case is Fannie Mae, where the firm gets an indirect subsidy by the government as it is too big 
to fail and has the moral hazard of lender of the last resort. 
xlv
 Summary from issue 11 of the Public Policy Institute of California 
xlvi
 Jorion, Philipp.  
xlvii
 2005 Estimate, Department of Finance of California, http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/e-
1press.pdf 
xlviii
 With the strong performance of the county, the treasurer borrowed $ 2 for every $ 1 of assets and 
invested them 
xlix
 Interest rate derivatives with a hope that interest rates will increase 
l
 Rodden (2003); this is a summary of Rodden’s case study of Brazil. 
li
 Rodden (2003); this is a summary of Rodden’s case study of Brazil. 
lii
 Rodden (2003) 
liii
 Rodden (2003)  
liv
 Rodden (2003) 
lv
 Rodden (2003) 
lvi
 Coordination failures are relevant here as it is difficult to get few private sector investors to coordinate 
in a multi-million public utility project 
lvii
 Gordon (1983), Slemrod (1983) 
lviii
 For an economic analysis see Varma (1989) 
lix
 Kothari, pg. 98;citing Kamal Narayan Kabra (1983) The Black Economy in India: Problems and 
Policies. 
lx
 The introduction of black money does bring a problem of excess money supply into the market which is 
beyond the scope of analysis for this paper 
lxi
 For an alternative path see Municipal Finance Overview (2005) 
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